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1 Introduction
National budgets tighten, policies change, carbon 
prices fluctuate, and international financial mechanisms 
stutter. In each case, risk perceptions mount and the 
task of encouraging private sector investment in climate 
change related infrastructure becomes more difficult, 
and potentially more costly. 
Policymakers, who are responsible for encouraging this 
investment and making sure that it is reasonably priced, 
may feel that the task is beyond their control; after all, 
in many cases the cost of raising finance appears to 
be controlled by the market and its laws of supply and 
demand. But what drives the supply and demand for 
finance, is risk; and one thing that policymakers can 
cause, control, alleviate, or help mitigate, is risk.
Risk — whether real or perceived — is the single most 
important factor preventing projects from finding finan-
cial investors, or raising the returns that these investors 
demand. Risk and risk perceptions vary significantly 
from project to project, technology to technology, 
industry to industry, and country to country. Since 
higher financial returns are required to cover higher 
risks, the variation between project risks explains much 
of the difference in financing costs. Green investments 
typically suffer higher risk perceptions due to a depen-
dence on public policy and, often, the relative immatu-
rity of technologies, markets, and industries.  
Not all risks need mitigation from policymakers; inves-
tors may be quite willing to take on some risk, although 
they might take on certain risk categories only if the 
price is very good. Understanding which sets of inves-
tors will accept which risks at what price is critical to 
developing policies and instruments to reduce them.
In this paper, we develop a framework for categorizing 
the risks that may befall green infrastructure projects, 
match them with available risk mitigation instruments, 
and identify where gaps between the supply and 
demand for risk mitigation continue to impede invest-
ment. Our findings suggest that: 
 • There are gaps in risk coverage, particularly 
for policy risks and financing risks (including 
investment liquidity risks).
 • In developed markets, where policies have 
undergone frequent changes, there are gaps 
in risk coverage for policy risk. There are also 
gaps in coverage for physical and technical 
risks for the least mature technologies. Project 
interventions address financing risks for specific 
projects, but do not address liquidity risks.
 • In developing markets, both the perception of 
risks and the supply of risk instruments are 
higher than in developed markets. As with 
developed markets, there is a gap in policy risk 
coverage. Financing risks are higher than in 
developed markets due to immature financial 
institutions and markets and not sufficiently 
covered by existing instruments. Concessional 
resources address these financial risks at the 
project level, but do not address liquidity risks.
Policy makers and new policies should focus on 
addressing this unmatched demand in order to unlock 
additional financing for green investments. 
In chapter two, we classify the risks perceived most 
acutely by investors and developers, before matching 
these risks to the supply of risk instruments at various 
phases of the investment life-cycle in chapter three. In 
chapter four, we identify gaps in risk coverage. In related 
reports, we will address specific risk mitigation instru-
ments against the framework and gaps laid out in this 
paper.
Our analysis is developed from workshops and one-on-
one interviews with investors, insurers, project finan-
ciers, and bankers1 — aimed at identifying which risks 
and barriers concern them the most when committing 
resources to green investments — and evidence emerg-
ing from the in-depth analysis of financing models for 
renewable energy infrastructure within the San Giorgio 
Group case studies.2 These case studies help us identify 
the issues and the most effective solutions to mobilize 
financial resources for low carbon and climate resilient 
infrastructure.  
1 On June 27, 2012, the Climate Policy Initiative and the Climate Bonds 
Initiative organized a workshop with insurers, project financiers, and 
investment bankers to kick-start a discussion on which perceived risks had 
critical bearing on investments in green infrastructure projects, as well as 
the desired features of risk mitigation tools that might be offered by the 
industry or policymakers (Climate Policy Initiative, Climate Bond Initiative, 
2012). On September 3, 2012, CPI participated in the “Conference call 
on unblocking clean energy finance” organized by the United Nations 
Environmental Programme (UNEP) that gathered insurers, investors, and 
researchers to discuss the key issues that a policy risk insurance facility 
(currently under development) should be able to face. 
2 Throughout 2012, CPI has published three case studies within the San 
Giorgio Group series:
• Prosol Tunisia, on the financing of small scale solar water heating 
equipment through governmental subsidies and consumer lending 
offered by local commercial banks;
• Walney Offhshore Windfarms, on the engagement of institutional 
investors in the financing of offshore wind in the UK;
• Ouarzazate I Concentrated Solar Power, Morocco, on the structuring 
of a public-private partnership to finance a large and expensive solar 
plant, combining both concessional public resources and commercial 
private ones.
The complete series of case studies is available on CPI’s website: www.climate-
policyinitiative.org/venice/publication/san-giorgio-group-case-studies-2/
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2 The perception of risks for 
green infrastructure investing
A reliance on public resources to make low-
carbon and climate resilient (green) investments 
financially viable dramatically increases investors’ 
perceptions of policy risks.
The innovative nature of most renewable energy 
technologies strongly impacts perceptions about 
technical risks.
Long investment horizons, coupled with high 
upfront costs and a lack of dedicated investors, 
raise the perception of financing and liquidity 
risks.
The amount of public funds necessary to support 
green investments, and severe budget constraints, 
increase the public sector’s perception of outcome 
risks. 
There are various types and categories of risk that 
accompany investment, and more particularly, green 
investment, which we define here as low-carbon or 
climate resilient investment. Here, we group3 risks into 
four categories according to their different sources and 
character: 
 • Political, policy, and social risks: originate in 
the social dimension (governments, public 
opinion, individuals, or groups of citizens). 
These risks derive from both the legitimate 
actions of authorities exercising their legislative 
functions (policy/regulatory risks), and illegiti-
mate and discriminatory acts by authorities and 
citizens, such as the consequences of repealed 
contracts, expropriation, and political violence 
and instability (political risks). The category also 
includes risks of social unrest and reputation 
(social risks) and misappropriation of resources 
(governance risk);4
 • Technical, physical risks: derive from the 
physical characteristics of the assets and/
or the surrounding environment. They are 
3 All risks classifications are subjective and different from each other: 
“Identifying the different types of risks is a varied art that differs between 
practitioners” (OECD 2008).
4 The clean-cut distinction between political and policy risk that we apply 
is less obvious in existing and emerging policy risk instruments, which 
are typically classified under the Expropriation clause of Political Risk 
coverage.
technology-specific (such as construction 
and operation risks, environmental impacts, 
and decommissioning risk5) or related to the 
ongoing availability of natural resources (reli-
ability of output risk);
 • Market, commercial risks: these originate in the 
economic dimension (the action of markets and 
commercial counterparties) and relate to the 
economic value of inputs and outputs (price 
volatility risks and the value of environmental 
markets) as well as the costs and availability 
of financial resources (financing, liquidity, and 
counterparty risks);6 and
 • Outcome risks: are perceived by the public 
sector and are linked to the ability of public-
ly-supported green projects to meet objectives, 
whether they be emissions reductions or 
co-impacts, within expected costs (budget 
risks). 
We present a more detailed analysis of these risks and 
their characteristics for both conventional and green 
investments in Annex A.
At first glance, most of these risks do not appear unique 
to green investments. However, particular aspects of 
both low-carbon and climate resilient investments fre-
quently increase the perception of relatively common-
place risks. For example: 
 • The reliance on public support amplifies the 
perception of policy risks by developers and 
investors while, at the same time, increasing the 
perception of outcome risks by governments 
and public authorities; 
 • The innovative nature of some green technolo-
gies and the lack of a track record for their per-
formance raise the perception of technical risks;
 • Multi-year investment horizons and long 
payback periods7 increase perceived market and 
commercial risks as well as policy risk.8 
5 Decommissioning costs may exceed initial projections and/or earmarked 
reserves, or the infrastructure can be compulsory decommissioned much 
earlier than expected. 
6 Some of the commercial risks stem directly from other risks and translate 
into market manifestations of political/policy and physical risks. Overlaps 
and relationships between different risk categories become highly relevant 
when considering how a risk mitigation instrument can impact on several 
different risks at the same time.
7 The payback period is the time needed by the investor to recover negative 
cash flows with the cost savings/revenues originated by the investment 
(Trabacchi et al, 2012).
8 The life cycle of green infrastructure investments largely outlives access to 
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The confluence of these factors places green invest-
ments outside most investors’ “comfort zone,” i.e. their 
business-as-usual investment options, requiring the 
public sector to address the perceived higher invest-
ment risks. 
Figure 1 briefly summarizes the specific sources of risks 
and elements that, in the case of green investments, 
increase their perception. 
finance (and refinance) and political cycles.
POLITICAL, POLICY, SOCIAL RISKS
Sources:
 • Actions of governments and citizens
Enhanced by:
 • Reliance on public financial and institutional support
 • Investment horizon longer than policy cycle
 • Environmental impact of some technologies creating 
social resistance
TECHNICAL, PHYSICAL RISKS
Sources:
 •  Technology characteristics
 •  Environment/sites impacts 
Enhanced by:
 • Not yet proven green technologies
 •  Lack of accurate technology performance data
 •  Uncertainty over measurements of the natural 
resources availability
MARKET, COMMERCIAL RISKS
Sources:
 •  Valuation of input and output
 •  Cost and availability of financial resources
Enhanced by:
 •  High upfront costs
 •  Long investment horizon and payback periods
 • Financiers’ unfamiliarity with green investments
 •  Complexity of infrastructure investments
OUTCOME RISKS
Sources:
 •  Commitment of limited public resources
 •  Uncertainty of delivering public interest goals 
objectives
Enhanced by:
 •  Amount of public support required
 •  Current budget constraints
Figure 1: Perceived Risks Classification
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3 The classification of risk 
mitigation instruments
A variety of organizations offer policies and instruments 
that attempt to mitigate green investment risk.
Here, we identify six categories of risk mitigation instru-
ments and note whether they are generally provided 
by the private or the public sector.9 The private sector 
is generally the primary provider of bilateral contracts 
and insurance, while both the public and private sectors 
provide credit enhancement instruments. Governments 
and public bodies are the primary providers of revenue 
support policies, direct concessional investments, and 
institutional support.
 • Bilateral Contracts are well-established instru-
ments addressing specific (non-credit-related) 
project risks. They are usually provided by 
private entities to cover technical risks related 
to the implementation or the operation phases 
of projects, and/or output price risks (e.g. Power 
Purchase Agreements, which secure both the 
quantity and the price of the power that the 
project will sell to an off-taker).10
 • Credit Enhancement Instruments are usually 
developed by specialized entities of both 
public and private nature (e.g. monoline 
insurers, guarantee funds/facilities), that 
guarantee partially or in full the liabilities of a 
project towards its lenders. They improve the 
quality of loans/bonds issued by the projects, 
by mitigating the borrower’s credit risk and 
enhancing coverage of debt service obligations.11 
 • Insurance is a well-established risk mitigation 
instrument, typically provided by private 
companies. It is used to transfer risk from one 
entity to another specialized in pooling risks 
together, in exchange for a premium and upon 
verification of the liability of the claim.12
9 See Annex B for details on each instrument.
10 For more advanced technologies, contracts can often be highly specific, 
demanding complex drafting and implying high transaction costs. For 
example, an Engineering Procurement and Construction (EPC) contract for 
an offshore wind farm can involve several contractors with very different 
areas of expertise and responsibilities who need to be coordinated for the 
different phases of construction (i.e. installation of the monopiles foun-
dation into the seabed, fitting of cables and turbines onto the monopoles, 
and the construction of the offshore substation from which power is 
transmitted to shore).
11 Instruments range from market-based tools developed by the private 
sector, such as securitization, to the use of public resources to allow credit 
access at concessional terms.
12 Insurance policies are very common in mitigating physical risks but have 
 • Revenue Support Policies are the public 
sector’s main tool for promoting low-emission 
projects by reducing output price risks and 
offering resources that reduce financing risks 
(i.e. tax credit/equity). They are widely used in 
both developed and developing countries but, 
as technology deployment increases, they tend 
to become more onerous for public budgets – 
creating, in a sort of feedback loop, incentive 
for governments to renegotiate them, and for 
investors, perception of policy risks.13
 • Direct Concessional Investments from public 
entities (governments’ budgets, bilateral and 
multilateral development banks, dedicated pri-
vate-equity facilities, and international climate 
funds) mitigate financing risks by providing 
loans or equity funding that enhances the 
financial viability of low-emission projects.14 
 • Indirect Political/Institutional Support refers to 
public, non-financial, interventions that usually 
target multiple risks. This category includes 
technical assistance for sustainable energy 
policies, and capacity building activities (e.g., 
quality certificates). 
This list includes both dedicated instruments that 
directly address specific risks (e.g., contracts and 
insurance policies), as well as broader or more diffused 
instruments that address multiple risks at once (e.g., 
political commitments to environmental protection). It 
is clear that single instruments may affect several risks 
simultaneously, directly, and indirectly.15 In order to 
better identify areas where supply is limited or inade-
quate, our analysis only links instruments to the risks 
they are specifically designed to address.16 Table 1 lists 
the main instruments within these six groups and identi-
fies the category or categories of risk they directly aim 
to address.
also become popular in addressing political risks. See for reference policies 
offered by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).
13 This is the case of the very popular fixed-price Feed-in Tariff (FiT) payment 
policies (see for reference the case of the Spanish FiT system for solar 
PV that was renegotiated in 2008 (IEA, 2011b)). Recent examples of FiT 
include price adjustment mechanisms or an overall cap to total support 
available. 
14 The involvement of concessional finance, while very powerful, is often 
accompanied by lengthy procedures, heavy compliance and monitoring 
requests, and stringent requirements.
15 For example a better “direct” mitigation of construction risks does improve 
“indirectly” financial risks as well, by reducing uncertainty around con-
struction costs and timing.
16 Indirect mitigation of other risks should also be considered when looking 
in detail at the effectiveness of a single instrument.
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INSTRUMENT TYPE INSTRUMENT NAME PO
LIT
IC
AL
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PO
LIC
Y, 
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L, 
PH
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IC
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T, 
CO
M
M
ER
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OU
TC
OM
E
Contracts
1. Engineering, Procurement and Construction Contract 
(EPC); Operation & Maintenance Contract (O&M)
2. Emissions Reduction Purchase Agreement (ERPA)
3. Foreign Exchange Swaps / Futures
4. Power Purchase Agreement (PPA)
Credit 
Enhancement
1. Interest Rate Subsidy
2. Letter of Credit
3. Loan and Credit Guarantee
4. Securitization
Insurance
1. Private Insurance (general)
2. Delays in Start-up (DSU)
3. Private Political Risk Insurance
4. Public Political Risk Insurance / Guarantee
Revenue Support 
Policy
1. Feed-in-Tariffs /Feed-in-Premia
2. Tradeable Permits / Certificates
3. Tax Credits / Tax Equity
4. Fossil Fuels subsidy policy
Direct Investment
1. Concessional Loans Funding
2. Dedicated Private-equity Funds
3. Equity-investments of Dev Banks
4. International Climate Funds
5. Public-Private Partnership (PPP)
Political / 
Institutional 
Support
1. Capacity Building / Technical Assistance
2. Database / Information tracking tools
3. Quality Standards
RISK 
CLASSIFICATIONTable 1: Risk Mitigation Instruments
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4 Supply and demand for 
investment risks - Gaps
In order to analyze whether perceived risks are 
addressed by risk mitigation instruments, we next 
map the demand for and the supply of risk mitigation 
instruments in Figure 2, alongside the life-cycle of green 
infrastructure projects. 
We assess the intensity of perceived risks (colored 
boxes from light to dark) by asking investors and project 
financiers to identify which risks concern them most 
when assessing potential investments.17 To assess the 
supply of risk coverage, we consider the availability of 
several risk mitigation instruments (see Annex B).18 
In Figures 2 and 3, we combine the classification of 
perceived risks of Section 2 with the map of the cur-
rently available instruments (and the risks they address) 
from Table 1. We have distinguished our analysis 
between developed markets (Section 4.1) and devel-
oping markets (Section 4.2) because the intensity of 
risk perception and the availability of instruments differ 
respectively.
17 Please see footnotes 1 and 2.
18 Although a detailed analysis of the effectiveness and adequacy of each 
instrument is outside the scope of this work, we have included into our 
mapping only the instruments that are “effectively” available to investors 
(established and proved instruments), while we have excluded those 
instruments still in their planning or testing phase.
4.1 Risk coverage gaps in developed 
markets
Political, Policy, and Social Risks
Retroactive cuts to support policies19 have signifi-
cantly increased the perception of policy risks in 
developed countries. This has been compounded 
further by the ongoing (mainly European) sovereign 
debt crises. Policy risk is primarily perceived by project 
developers during the phases of development, construc-
tion and operation, but also by lenders and investors 
during the financing stage.20 Our outreach suggests 
that coverage for policy risk is especially inadequate 
in developed markets.
 Technical and Physical Risks
Though not shown in Figure 2,21 physical and technical 
risks are inversely related to the level of maturity of 
specific technologies. Less mature technologies are 
less likely to be covered by risk mitigation instruments 
(such as construction and operations agreements), 
and this can strongly hinder the development of these 
technologies. 
Why does this happen? It originates from difficulties in 
measuring the impacts of risk and pricing its mitigation. 
19 Often in the form of Feed-in-Tariffs as in the cases of Spain in 2010 and 
Czech Republic in 2010 (BusinessGreen, 2012; SolarPlaza. 2010).
20 When financing a RE project underpinned by a pubic revenue support poli-
cy, the future state-guaranteed revenues are typically used as collateral for 
loans and credit lines, hence defined bankable. High levels of policy risks 
may induce lenders to no longer accept this kind of collateral.
21 Both charts consider the different green technologies in aggregate so that 
their individual technologies’ results are unfortunately hidden. 
In developed markets, gaps occur between 
the demand for, and supply of, a range of risk 
mitigation tools:
• Budget constraints and governments’ 
revisions of support policies have created 
demand for coverage of policy risk that is not 
yet met;
• Physical and technical risks are highly 
influenced by the maturity of technologies. 
Gaps in risk coverage occur in the most 
prospective technologies; and
• Project-by-project interventions have done 
little to increase investments’ liquidity and 
mitigate exit risks.
POLITICAL POLICY AND SOCIAL
TECHNICAL, PHYSICAL RISK
COM
M
ERCIAL, M
ARKET RISKS
OUTCOM
E RISKS
Political
Policy Change
Private 
Governance
Reputation & 
Social
Construction & 
O&M
Environment
Reliability of 
Output
Decom’g
Currency
Output Price
Envir Markets
Access to 
Capital
Liquidity
Counter-party
Emission 
Reduction
Co-impacts
Public Budget 
Impact
P R O J E C T  L I F E  C Y C L E
Developm
ent
6
6
6
6
Construction
6
1, 3
3
Financing
1
1, 4
1, 4
2, 5
2
Operation
6
6
6
3
1, 6
1, 4
1, 4
2
Decom
m
issioning
6
Outcom
e
6
6
6
6
6
K
EY:
Gaps 
in risk 
coverage
Dem
and 
intensity
High
Low
W
e use color to 
show
 the relative 
dem
and intensity 
from
 project 
stakeholders for risk 
coverage in different 
categories and at a 
particular stage in a 
project’s life cycle...
Figure 2 - Gaps between the dem
and for risk m
itigation instrum
ents and their supply, in developed m
arkets
Types of risk m
itigation instrum
ents:
1 
Contracts
2 
Credit Enhancem
ent
3 
Insurance
4 
Revenue Support Policy
5 
Direct Investm
ent
6 
Political/Institutional Support
...and num
bers 
represent w
hich type 
of risk m
itigation 
instrum
ent is 
used to cover that 
particular risk at that 
particular stage of a 
project’s life cycle.
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For the most innovative technologies, loss histories are 
not available, and providers of mitigation instruments 
either refuse to cover these technologies outright or 
charge precautionary, high fees, making the coverage 
uneconomical for developers and investors. The impos-
sibility of matching demand and supply of risk mitiga-
tion greatly increases investors’ risk premia and often 
compromises the overall financing of the projects.22 
As a technology becomes more commercially mature, 
uncertainty about its performance decreases and the 
demand for risk coverage starts to fall. It is perhaps 
ironic that the supply of coverage instruments actually 
increases at this stage.
Private parties and insurers are often reluctant to 
cover the risk that projects will not produce the 
amount of energy expected (output risks).23 When 
committing public resources to support green invest-
ments, the public sector also perceives output risks 
as critical: the amount of physical output produced by 
the technology directly determines actual emission 
reductions (and other co-benefits in terms of energy 
independency, fossil fuels savings), ultimately justifying 
public budget expenditures. However, output risks 
could be mitigated by forms of partnerships between 
public and private entities,24 through, for example, the 
provision of better quality databases, or policies geared 
toward offering performance/efficacy for cutting-edge 
technologies.25 
22 Project financiers from a large investment bank reported that, outside of 
some geographies (e.g. Denmark, The Netherlands) it’s challenging to find 
providers of adequately priced EPC contracts for offshore wind plants.
23 While there are examples of performance guarantees offered by technol-
ogy producers (and insurers) for more established renewable technolo-
gies (Munich RE is offering such a product on the efficiency of solar PV 
modules), we don’t know yet of contracts or insurance protecting from 
lower wind regimes or irradiation levels. During an interview, an insurer 
has highlighted the issues they face when covering the availability of wind 
in some contexts where the quality and granularity of the raw data is not 
sufficient (though our conversation remained on rather general terms, 
it’s well-known that wind measurements are highly site specific and the 
geographical coverage of the available databases is spotty). Privately 
offered weather derivatives can hedge against lower wind speeds or solar 
irradiaton levels; however the transaction costs involved (most contracts 
are privately negotiated and priced) and the technical issues involved 
(correlation between actual measurement and the benchmark in the con-
tract) limit their usage to a small portion of renewable energy generation 
(Molloy, 2011).
24 In the form of quality standards and accreditation schemes, publicly sup-
ported databases (see for reference the IEA R&D database on wind (www.
winddata.com). 
25 BNEF (2010) proposed an efficacy insurance scheme (insuring the efficacy 
of cutting-edge and untested technologies) and cited as a potential refer-
ence scheme the Massachusetts’ Fair Access to Insurance Requirements 
Our interactions with investors suggest that decom-
missioning risks (as defined in footnote 5) for green 
infrastructure do not rank high among perceived risks, 
most likely due to the long expected lifetime of assets 
and the low present value (after discounting) attached 
to the decommissioning costs.26 It is then not surprising 
to see that maturing renewable technologies, and even 
more established ones such as large hydropower, still 
lack dedicated instruments to manage decommission-
ing risks. 
Commercial and Market Risks
Power purchase agreements and revenue support 
policies have had reasonable success mitigating market 
risks, even though the former may increase the likeli-
hood of counterparty risks27 and the latter places the 
burden on rate payers and/or public budgets. By way 
of contrast, investors perceive financing risks as 
high, especially access to capital, counterparty, and 
liquidity risks. Most of the relevant mitigation instru-
ments for financing risks are provided by public entities 
(through loan and credit guarantees, interest rate sub-
sidies, public-private partnerships) although the private 
sector has a few at its disposal, such as banks’ letters of 
credit. 
However, widespread use of a project-by-project 
approach of these instruments and the current limited 
size of the securitization market28 has hindered the 
development of an investment-grade tradable market 
sufficient to address liquidity concerns and reduce 
the cost of capital. While some investors are able to 
hold less liquid securities and exploit their liquidity 
premium,29 the large majority of investors implementing 
portfolio strategies have limited appetite for unlisted, 
non-standard securities that are not actively traded 
in any market.30 Current trends in financial regulation 
(FAIR), a scheme to help home-owners in storm-affected areas that have 
difficulties in obtaining home insurance from private insurers. The scheme 
is collectively funded by all insurers in the state, aiming to fill a gap in the 
U.S. insurance market.
26 We note however that most renewable energy infrastructure (wind, solar) 
are characterized by manageable and predictable decommissioning costs, 
especially when compared to nuclear plants and fossil fuel extraction 
infrastructures.
27 “The PPA is the primary revenue stream contract, and as such it is critical 
the counterparty be creditworthy”, Porter Hedges (2011).
28 The Wind ABS issuance Breeze Finance in 2006 is the latest relevant deal 
in the industry. 
29 Liquidity premium is the excess return that a less liquid security needs to 
offer over an equivalent liquid (quoted and/or traded over active markets) 
one to compensate the investor for the extra risk.
30 Typically, the offering memorandum of a pension fund, mutual fund, and 
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will amplify these issues as they point to an increase of 
disclosure requirements31 or capital coverage32 for less 
liquid assets held by financial companies, banks, and 
insurers.
Recent issuance of climate and green bonds by the 
European Investment Bank, the International Finance 
Corporation/World Bank and Asian Development Bank 
(among others), seems to signal a shift towards the 
creation of a more liquid fixed-income market, which 
should help to address those liquidity risk concerns. 
However the cumulative size of these initiatives, as of 
today, represents only less than 2% of the overall global 
project finance debt market (USD 344.6 billion in 2011 
(Eckhart, 2012)).
Outcome Risks
A growing number of public institutions are using 
public-private partnerships and policies such as 
volume caps and cost limits to mitigate public per-
ception of outcome risks, specifically the risk that 
renewable investments could overextend public 
budgets. Budget constraints and sovereign debt issues 
in developed countries have placed a strong focus on 
the cost-effectiveness of public support policies, on the 
need to limit their burden on public resources, and on 
involving more private sector resources.
even (as the most unregulated investment vehicle) hedge fund will state 
an internal limit for illiquid/unlisted securities.
31 The U.S. Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) 157 Position paper 
on Fair Value Measurements, issued in 2007, classifies all securities in a 
three-level system and requires the inclusion of a risk premium for liquidity 
in the valuation of securities not ordinarily traded on active markets (Level 
2 and Level 3 assets). (DBAM, 2009)
32 As per Basel III requirements. 
4.2 Risk coverage gaps in developing 
markets
Investors have long-standing concerns about investing 
in many developing countries. It is not surprising that 
the majority of our workshop participants/interview 
subjects perceive the overall level of risks in develop-
ing markets to be higher than in developed ones.
Political, Policy, and Social Risks
The perception of both political and policy risk in 
developing markets is very high. Coverage for polit-
ical risks is usually bundled together with polit-
ical risk insurance offered by organizations such 
as the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA - World Bank Group) and the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation (OPIC). 
As with developed countries, there are significant 
gaps in supply of instruments to address policy risks. 
The presence of international donors and development 
institutions in financing green investment projects in 
developing countries indirectly mitigates policy risk, due 
to perceptions about their influence or ability to exert 
‘political leverage’ on host country authorities.33 We 
explore emerging proposals to mitigate the perception 
of policy risks in developing countries in a dedicated 
paper (Risk Gaps: Policy Risk Instruments) focused on 
policy risk insurance instruments.
33 Concessional financing is frequently linked to broader policy reforms and 
part of complex interactions and financial relationships between local 
authorities, donor governments and development banks. In such circum-
stances, it becomes harder (and more expensive) for the host country to 
recede from agreed policy commitments that would damage both external 
private investments and concessional financing, as they can have negative 
effects on the financing received for other purposes. 
In developing markets, the overall level of 
perceived risks is higher than in developed 
markets, but so is the supply of risk mitigation 
instruments:
• Instruments only appear to address political 
risk, not policy risk; and
• Perceptions of financing risks are heightened 
by the perceived weakness of domestic 
financial institutions and markets. These 
risks have been mostly addressed with 
concessional resources, which do not improve 
the liquidity of investments or attract private 
finance.
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Physical and Technical Risks
The perception of technical risks is roughly compa-
rable to that in developed countries. The exception 
is that there is generally a higher perception of output 
risks in most developing countries arising from the lack 
of good quality data and sufficiently long track records. 
This can impact the reliability of projects’ financial 
planning as well as the perception of outcome risk by 
authorities supporting investments.34
Commercial and Market Risks
In less developed financial markets, high volatility 
(of currencies and power prices), scant liquidity, 
and high counterparty risks increase the perception 
that financial risks, already high in developed coun-
tries, are higher still in developing markets. Among 
financing risks, access to capital and counterparty risks 
are covered mostly by development banks’ extensive 
interventions and by support provided by international 
donors and local public authorities. Given the shortage 
of available public resources, there are questions around 
the sustainability and replicability of approaches that 
rely heavily on public resources.35 As with developed 
markets, project-by-project approaches to mitigate 
financial risks do little to help establish a tradable 
market (be it listed or over-the-counter) that would 
increase investments’ liquidity and reduce the risk of 
unfavorable exit from investments.
34 Lack of good and reliable data increases the uncertainty of production 
estimates, hence lowering the reliability of financial projections and 
increasing the risk that public interest goals, underpinning the eventual 
support from collective resources, are missed. 
35 The current efforts in developing public-private solutions (such as Pub-
lic-Private Partnerships) go towards the combination of private and public 
resources in delivering services previously supplied by public resources 
only.
Outcome Risks
Most projects supported by public spending aim to 
achieve key development goals (i.e. poverty reduc-
tion, creation of local jobs) but frequently weigh 
heavily on already tight public budgets and increase 
the perception of outcome risks. These risks are 
mostly mitigated through either quality standards 
imposed on project developers,36 or by increasing the 
involvement of private sector actors via private-public 
financing mechanisms and partnerships. However, we 
note that some efforts to mitigate outcome risks add 
to technical and physical risks, for example by impos-
ing local content clauses and/or extensive technical 
requirements.
36 An example is the compulsory quality certification system (Qualisol) re-
quired for technology installers in the Prosol Residential program in Tunisia 
for the support of the solar water heaters with households (Trabacchi et al, 
2012).
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Box: An optimal risk allocation framework
The allocation of risks to parties ill-suited to bear them tends to increase overall project costs (via 
higher risk premia and required returns) and ultimately, the probability of adverse outcomes (when 
the risk carrier has low ability to control it). Adequate risk coverage allows parties to reallocate risks 
to the parties best suited to take them.1 Optimal risk allocation should satisfy the following three 
operational conditions:
• Good information availability: Where perceptions of risk originate from information asymmetries, less 
informed parties will typically require a higher premium to carry the risk;
• Carrying capacity: A party who is less likely to be financially compromised by a risk event will require 
lower premiums;
• Enforcement ability: A party with high ability to enforce compliance and influence the outcome of the 
risk will require a lower premium.
The risk allocation framework depicted in Figure 4 builds upon the OECD risk sharing model for public-
private partnerships (OECD, 2008). Risks are distinguished as being either endogenous or exogenous:
• Endogenous risks are risks which the project developer or sponsor has a certain extent of control 
over and can directly manage in order to influence the actual outcome (e.g. technology, management 
of financial resources).
• Exogenous risks are risks which the project developer has neither control over, nor ability to mitigate 
(e.g. political risks, adverse changes in national policies, currency devaluation) and are better 
managed by the public actor.
Figure 4 - Risk allocation framework
1 The party who can manage the risks at least cost (Corner, 2006).
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Political, policy and social risks are exogenous and therefore difficult for private parties — who have 
limited ability to enforce compliance on public authorities — to manage. Thus, following the OECD 
classification (OECD, 2008), we note that the public sector (at national or international levels) would be 
better positioned to enforce compliance and lower the probability of their occurrence.
Technical and physical risks are typically endogenous, and hence often borne more efficiently by 
the private sector. With proper due diligence and expertise, developers are best placed to control and 
manage these risks.2 However, due to high uncertainty about green investments and the lack of good 
quality data on renewable resources,3 pooling risk between private and public actors could promote 
better management of this kind of risk.4
Commercial and market risks are normally borne more efficiently by the private sector and shared 
between different parties, either through bilateral contracts or through exchanges of securities in 
financial markets.5 However, in countries characterized by under-developed or non-existent financial 
markets, the public sector (e.g. governments, development banks, export credit agencies) might be 
called upon to bridge the gaps and assume some of the risks.
Outcome risks are often seen as exogenous to the project and, according to a theoretical optimal 
allocation framework, would be managed better by the public sector. That said, their occurrence can 
also be linked to project-related factors (such as technical performance, implementation, and project 
design), suggesting that a shared allocation between public and private might actually be more suitable.
2 Evidence from the San Giorgio Group case studies shows that, even in projects with extensive public support such as the Ouarzazate I CSP one, private 
developers and investors take full charge of technical and physical risks. These risks are managed with in depth due-diligence on the available resources 
in situ and careful determination of technology’s specifications before the completion of the bidding process and signing of concession arrangements 
(Hervè-Mignucci, 2012; Falconer, Frisari, 2012). 
3 On previous performance, on availability of natural resources in situ, etc.
4 Through, for example, contractual specifications in the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) for the uncertainty on the output, or through pooled funds for 
environmental damages. In the Guerdane Water Project in Morocco the hydrological risk (i.e. risk of availability of a certain amount of water) shouldered 
by the private investor has been capped at 15% of revenues, with the excess borne by the government and the farmers (Head, 2006). However, in na-
scent industries still far from commercial maturity, developers may struggle to find private counterparties willing to accept those risks, calling upon public 
ones to step in.
5 We refer here to trading of exchange-listed contracts (derivates such as options, swaps, futures) to allocate risks such as currency and prices’ volatility; or 
to trading of equity and debt securities to allocate financing risks according to investors’ own risk appetite.
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5 Bridging the gap: recent 
developments on new risk 
mitigation instruments
Within this framework for demand and supply of risk 
mitigation, we will explore existing and new instruments 
designed to address those instances of unmet demand. 
In particular, in two complementary papers, we inves-
tigate two new sets of instruments — first loss protec-
tion and policy risk insurance — conceived to mitigate 
financing and liquidity risk, and policy risk respectively. 
We aim to assess how well they contribute to effective 
risk management, considering the following elements:
 • The risks addressed: At a minimum, effective 
instruments need to address the specific risks 
for which they been created, but they can also 
indirectly mitigate other risks as well;
 • Their costs: Both explicit fees and implicit 
transaction costs need to be lower than the 
benefits/savings that the instruments yield;
 • Complexity and availability/accessibility: 
Complexity usually impedes wide utilization of 
instruments and increases transaction costs, 
making the instruments less accessible; 
 • The suitability of the party bearing the risk: An 
ill-suited risk bearer would either fail to effec-
tively control the risk or charge very high risk 
premia for mitigation;
 • Secondary/indirect effects: The instrument 
itself, can, in some extremes, compromise its 
own effectiveness (the most typical example is 
through moral hazard); and
 • Timeliness of the remedy: Excessively lengthy 
procedures and untimely remedies greatly 
compromise instruments’ effectiveness by 
reducing the perceived benefit of the mitigation. 
6 Final remarks
The scarcity of capital available from traditional pro-
viders, together with political and financial constraints 
faced by governments, has significantly increased the 
perception of different kinds of risk that, if placed on 
parties unwilling or unsuited to carry them, hinder the 
flow of resources towards much needed low-carbon, 
climate resilient investments. Some of these risks are 
very specific to green infrastructure. Others are com-
monplace for infrastructure investing in general but face 
particularly high perception for green investments.
While public and private entities provide several 
risk mitigation instruments, the current supply only 
partially covers these risks. In particular, policy risk and 
financing risks are not fully covered by existing instru-
ments and prevent the flow of finance in both developed 
and developing markets. We believe public resources 
have a role in addressing those instances of unmet 
demand for risk mitigation. 
In complementary papers, we conduct a structural 
analysis of new risk mitigation instruments aimed at 
highlight the critical issues for designing effective risk 
solutions for low-carbon investments, to lay the founda-
tion for a productive conversation among practitioners, 
investors, and policymakers. 
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Table 2 - Political, policy, and social risks
Annex A: Classification of 
demand of risk coverage
Political, policy, and social risks
 • Political risks are due to illegitimate 
actions of public authorities that affect, in 
a discriminatory way, foreign companies/
investors. 
 • Policy risks involve legitimate actions 
of local authorities that affect all agents 
(local and foreign) in a sector. They 
originate from local governments simply 
exercising their power to rule the activities 
under their jurisdiction.
 • Social risks are due to actions of private 
individuals or groups in the public opinion. 
They may take the form of private 
governance issues or public reputation 
and social resistance issues.
RISK TYPE
TRADITIONAL FEATURES
GREEN INVESTM
ENTS 
ADDITIONAL RISK
IM
PACT
RESPONSE
INITIAL BEARER
OPTIM
AL BEARER
Political, 
Policy and 
Social
Public 
Governance / 
Corruption
Corruption and bribes; 
Unreliability of governm
ent's 
liability; Repeal of contracts; 
Capital controls
High as m
ost green projects 
need to be developed together 
w
ith the public sector
Project unfeasibility / 
Higher Costs
Abandon
Project Sponsor
International 
Organization
Legal and 
Ow
nership rights
Risk of property expropriation; 
Ow
nership claim
s;  Land tenure 
claim
s
Project unfeasibility
Abandon
Project Sponsor
Dom
estic Public 
Sector/ International 
Organization
Perm
itting / Siting
Perm
itting delays, denial or 
repeal; Forced relocation
Som
e technologies (W
ind, 
Hydro, Concentrated Solar) are 
highly site-specific
Project unfeasibility
Abandon
Project Sponsor
Dom
estic Public 
Sector
Policy
Change of support to tariffs or 
to overall lelvel of subsidization
High reliance on public 
support for technologies not 
yet com
m
ercially m
ature
Lower revenues
Increase Req Return / 
Abandon
Project Sponsor
International 
Organization / 3rd 
party Insurance
Private 
Governance
Resources m
isuse and 
m
isappropriation
Project unfeasibility / 
Higher Costs
Abandon
Project Sponsor
Project Sponsor / 3rd 
party Insurance
Reputation / 
Social Opposition
Reputation dam
ages ; Protest 
from
 local citizens
Som
e technologies (W
ind, 
Hydro) face high social 
resistance
Dam
age costs and 
delays / Unforeseen 
Liabilities
Abandon
Project Sponsor
Dom
estic Public 
Sector
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Technical and physical risks
 • Construction and operation risks are due to 
uncertainty over the cost and timing of con-
struction and over the cost of operations. 
 • Physical output risks originate from uncer-
tainty over the effective availability of the 
natural resource on the specific site. These risks 
are increased by the lack of highly accurate, 
site-specific data.
 • Environmental impact risks relate to 
unexpected adverse impacts of the green infra-
structure on its surrounding environment.
 • Decommissioning risks relate to the potential 
need to dismantle assets earlier than planned or 
at higher costs.
RISK TYPE
TRADITIONAL FEATURES
GREEN INVESTM
ENTS 
ADDITIONAL RISK
IM
PACT
RESPONSE
INITIAL BEARER
OPTIM
AL BEARER
Technical, 
Physical Risk
Construction
Construction delays ; 
Substandard construction
Increased risk due to novelty of 
som
e technologies
Higher costs
Increase Required 
Return
Project Sponsor
Sub-contractor / 
Insurance
Environm
ental 
(im
pacts, 
acceptance)
Unforeseen im
pacts on 
environm
ent ; Clean up 
liabilities
Uncertainty due to novelty of 
m
ost RE technologies
Unforeseen Costs
Increase Req Ret / 
Abandon
Project Sponsor
Sub-contractor / 
Insurance
Reliability of 
Output
Actual production regim
es 
below
 projections
Increased due to natural 
variability, interm
ittency etc
Lower revenues
Increase Required 
Return
Project Sponsor
Project Sponsor / 
Off-taker
Operation and 
M
anagem
ent
Inability to operate and m
anage 
the asset as budgeted
Increased risk due to novelty of 
som
e technologies
Higher costs
Increase Required 
Return
Project Sponsor
Sub-contractor
Decom
m
issioning
Forced anticipated dism
antling 
; Inability to dism
antle at 
planned costs
Technology specific - higher 
and uncertain for som
e RE 
(Offshore W
ind)
Higher Costs / 
Liabilities
Increased Req Ret / 
Abandon
Project Sponsor
Sub-contractor / 
Public authorities
Table 3 – Technical and physical risk
 23A CPI Report
The Risk Gap: A Map of Risk Mitigation Instruments for Clean InvestmentsJanuary 2013
Market and commercial risks
 • Currency risks occur when 
projects are financed with 
loans denominated in foreign 
currency but have revenues 
denominated in local 
currency.
 • Market risks relate to the 
uncertainty on the demand 
for the project output, and on 
the price at which the output 
can be sold and/or the inputs 
can be purchased.
 • Financing risks relate to 
uncertainties in access to 
capital for financing and 
re-financing, in terms of avail-
ability and cost of investment 
capital.
 • Counterparty and credit risks 
refer to the ability of counter-
parties to honor contracted 
obligations.
 • Liquidity / Exit risks refer 
to uncertainties about 
the realized value when 
monetizing the investment 
before the end of the 
asset’s life cycle (for equity 
sponsors), or maturity of 
loans (for lenders).
RISK TYPE
TRADITIONAL FEATURES
GREEN INVESTM
ENTS 
ADDITIONAL RISK
IM
PACT
RESPONSE
INITIAL BEARER
OPTIM
AL BEARER
Com
m
ercial, 
M
arket Risks
Currency Risk
Unfavorable currency 
fluctuations
Uncertain financial 
perform
ance
Increase Required 
Return
Project Sponsor/ 
Debt Investor
Developm
ent and 
Com
m
ercial Banks/ 
Currency Funds
Output Price 
Volatility
Uncertainty on realized 
output price; excessive m
arket 
volatility, lack of dem
and
High risk due to long horizon 
of investm
ents and lack of 
com
m
ercial m
aturity
Lower / unstable 
revenues
Increase Required 
Return
Project Sponsor
Power Off-Taker, 
Public Authorities
M
arket-based 
Environm
ental 
Instrum
ents Volatility
Uncertainty on realized GHG/
pollutant externality price, 
excessive m
arket volatility
Lower revenues
Increase Required 
Return
Project Sponsor
International Carbon 
M
arket / Carbon 
off-taker
Access to Capital
Shortage of required capital; 
capital charges higher than 
budgeted
Lack of understanding of RE in 
financing com
m
unities; Long 
investm
ent horizon 
Excessive cost of 
capital /  capital 
shortage
Increase Req Ret / 
Abandon
Project Sponsor/ 
Debt Investor
M
arket/ 
Developm
ent and 
Com
m
ercial Banks 
/ Export Credit 
Agencies
Counterparty / Credit 
Risk
Lack of enforceable collateral; 
Unreliable counterparties 
(public/private)
Lack of established investm
ent 
networks
Full or partial loss of 
capital
Increase Req Ret / 
Abandon
Project Sponsor/ 
Debt Investor
M
arket / 
Developm
ent and 
Com
m
ercial Banks 
/ Export Credit 
Agencies
Investm
ent Liquidity/ 
Exit
Significant m
ark-dow
n on 
secondary m
arkets; Excessive 
transaction costs
Niche and specialized m
arket; 
Lack of dedicated investors/
m
arkets
Uncertain financial 
perform
ance
Increase Req Ret / 
Abandon
Project Sponsor/ 
Debt Investor
M
arket / 
Developm
ent and 
Com
m
ercial Banks
Table 4 – M
arket and com
m
ercial risks
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Outcome risks
 • Emissions reduction risks relate to projects, 
once financed and commissioned, failing to 
deliver renewable energy that displaces fossil 
fuel based energy.
 • Co-impacts risks can occur when projects 
fail to deliver on indirect impacts such as the 
creation of green jobs, the improvement of air 
pollution, or energy security.
 • Budget impact risks refer to the possibility that 
public commitments to green infrastructure 
significantly increase above budget capacity.
RISK TYPE
TRADITIONAL FEATURES
GREEN INVESTM
ENTS 
ADDITIONAL RISK
IM
PACT
RESPONSE
INITIAL BEARER
OPTIM
AL BEARER
Outcom
e risks
Em
ission Reduction 
Targets
Failure of policies to achieve 
direct benefits and prim
ary 
effects (Em
ission Reduction)
Prim
ary targets 
m
issed
Am
endm
ent / repeal 
of policy
Governm
ents and 
public backers
Shared between 
Governm
ents and 
Private Sector
Co-im
pacts 
failure of policies to achieve 
in-direct benefits and second-
ary effects
Secondary targets of 
Green Grow
th / creation of 
local jobs-industries / energy 
security
Secondary targets 
m
issed
Decrease of public 
backing for policy
Governm
ents and 
public backers
Shared between 
Governm
ents and 
Private Sector
Public Budget Im
pact 
Policies' costs overruns
Production support policies 
spur excessive grow
th that 
inflates policies' costs
Costs greatly above 
budget's projections
Renegotiation / 
am
endm
ent / repeal 
of policy
Tax-payers and 
rate-payers
Shared between 
Governm
ents and 
Private Sector
Table 5 - Outcom
e risks
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Annex B: Classification of supply of risk coverage
1 The party who can manage the risks at least cost (Corner, 2006).
2 Evidence from the San Giorgio Group case studies shows that, even in projects with extensive public support such as the Ouarzazate I CSP one, pri-
vate developers and investors take full charge of technical and physical risks. These risks are managed with in depth due-diligence on the available 
resources in situ and careful determination of technology’s specifications before the completion of the bidding process and signing of concession 
arrangements (Hervè-Mignucci, 2012; Falconer, Frisari, 2012). 
3 On previous performance, on availability of natural resources in situ, etc.
4 Through, for example, contractual specifications in the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) for the uncertainty on the output, or through pooled 
funds for environmental damages. In the Guerdane Water Project in Morocco the hydrological risk (i.e. risk of availability of a certain amount of 
water) shouldered by the private investor has been capped at 15% of revenues, with the excess borne by the government and the farmers (Head, 
2006). However, in nascent industries still far from commercial maturity, developers may struggle to find private counterparties willing to accept 
those risks, calling upon public ones to step in.
5 We refer here to trading of exchange-listed contracts (derivates such as options, swaps, futures) to allocate risks such as currency and prices’ 
volatility; or to trading of equity and debt securities to allocate financing risks according to investors’ own risk appetite. 
INSTRUMENT 
TYPE
INSTRUMENT 
NAME DESCRIPTION
Contracts
Engineering, 
Procurement 
and Construction 
Contract (EPC);
Operation & 
Maintenance 
Contract (O&M)
Provider: Private
Risk type: Technical, Physical Risk
Description: : EPC and O&M contracts transfer the project risk for schedule changes, 
changing prices for materials, and labor (EPC), as well as risk related to the maintenances 
of the asset  (O&M) to the contractor, in exchange for a fixed price. Payments can be done 
in mutually agreed installments, while contracts may include penalty clauses for failure to 
achieve performance parameters
Payments can be done in mutually agreed installments, while contracts may include penalty 
clauses for failure to achieve performance parameters. 
Emissions 
Reduction Purchase 
Agreement (ERPA)
Provider: Private
Risk type: Commercial, Market Risk
Description: An Emissions Reduction Purchase Agreement is an agreement between the 
buyer and the seller of carbon credits from CDM/JI Projects. An ERPA identifies responsi-
bilities, rights, and obligations to manage risks, related to price fluctuations and delivery of 
emissions reductions. 
Foreign Exchange 
Swaps / Futures
Provider: Private
Risk type: Commercial, Market Risk
Description: A Foreign Exchange Swap is a contract in which one party borrows one currency 
from, and simultaneously lends another to, the second party. The purpose of a currency swaps 
is to hedge against risk exposure associated with exchange rate fluctuations, ensure receipt of 
foreign money, and to achieve better lending rates.
Power Purchase 
Agreement (PPA)
Provider: Public/Private
Risk type: Technical, Physical Risk
Description: A Power Purchase Agreement is a legal contract between an electricity 
generator (provider) and a power purchaser (typically a utility). It is used to cover uncertainty 
of the seller related to expected revenues of the project (which hamper its viability), or when 
the purchaser wants to secure supply of power at a predefined price (to know of any potential 
constraints for budget in advance).
Decommissioning 
Contract
Provider: Public/Private
Instrument type: Technical, Physical Risk
Description: Decommissioning contracts may include clauses for the distribution of risks 
related to the decommissioning phases of the project, in proportion to relative rewards and 
for minimizing potential for dispute. 
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INSTRUMENT 
TYPE
INSTRUMENT 
NAME DESCRIPTION
Credit 
Enhancement
First Loss Insurance
Provider: Public
Risk type: Commercial, Market Risk
Description: First loss insurance funds can be made available (by i.e. multilateral agencies) to 
cover part of the project losses in the event of its failure.
Interest Rate Subs
Provider: Public
Risk type: Commercial, Market Risk
Description: An Interest Rate Subsidy is provided to lower the cost of borrowing by reducing 
the amount of each payment for interests. 
This makes the project more affordable and, at the same time, allows banks to keep loans in 
line with their commercial rates. 
Letter of Credit
Provider: Private
Risk type: Commercial, Market Risk
Description: A Letter of Credit is a guarantee to a seller that goods or services will be paid for 
by the issuer of the letter of credit - usually a financial institution - regardless of whether the 
buyer ultimately fails to pay. In this way, the risk that the buyer will fail to pay is shifted from 
the seller to the issuing bank. 
Loan and Credit 
Guarantee
Provider: Public/Private
Risk type: Commercial, Market Risk
Description: 
Loan Guarantees - Contractual obligation by which a guarantor assumes the responsibility 
of assuring payment or fulfillment of a borrower’s debt or obligation, in case of default. Loan 
guarantees can refer to a private agreement with a bank, or to an agreement in which the 
government is the guarantor of the debt’s obligation. They can be direct, to intermediaries 
that provide finance directly to project developers, or counter-guarantees, to intermediaries 
that issue guarantees for the benefit of lending institutions.
Partial Credit Guarantees - Provided by Development Financial Institutions (both multilateral 
and some bilateral) at commercial rates to cover private lenders against the risk of debt 
service default by government or public (and recently private) sector borrowers, versus the 
payment of a guarantee-fee.  “Partial” is intended for a guarantee coverage amount lower than 
100% of the principal and/or interest.  PCGs can be used for any commercial debt instruments 
(loans, bonds) provided by any private institution, and are flexible with regards to the balance 
of risk sharing of the borrower’s credit. 
Export Credit Guarantees - Insurance policies provided by Export Credit Agencies, usually 
governmental agencies, which ensure that exporters are paid for goods shipped in the event 
the customer defaults, thus allowing exporters to keep their prices competitive. 
Securitization
Provider: Private
Risk type: Commercial, Market Risk
Description:  When raising financing through a project bond, the company or Special Purpose 
Vehicle will issue senior and subordinated tranches of debt. The subordinated tranche will 
take first losses and the credit standing of the senior debt will be enhanced because it will 
carry less risk.
Asset-backed securities - Securities which are based on pools of underlying assets, usually 
illiquid and private in nature. The "pooling" of assets makes the securitization large enough to 
be economical and to diversify the qualities of the underlying assets (diversifying risk).
Credit Tranching - Senior/Subordinated structures are the most popular technique to create 
internal credit enhancement. The subordinated tranches function as protective layers of the 
more senior tranches.
Green Bonds – Broadly defined as fixed-income securities that raise capital for a project with 
specific environmental benefits. Green bonds are backed by the assets they fund, the issuing 
institution, mortgages, or public sector loans (covered bonds), or guaranteed by a third party.
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INSTRUMENT 
TYPE
INSTRUMENT 
NAME DESCRIPTION
Insurance
Private Insurance 
(general)
Provider: Private
Instrument type: Technical, Physical Risk
Description: Insurance is a risk management tool used to address the risk of a contingent, 
uncertain loss. Insurance consists in the transfer of the risk of a loss, from one entity to 
another, in exchange for payment of a predefined amount of insurance coverage, called a 
premium.
Delays in Start-up 
(DSU)
Provider: Private
Instrument type: Technical, Physical Risk
Description: Also referred as delayed completion coverage, Delays in Start-up insurance 
indemnifies the insured in respect of ascertained income loss or specified additional expenses 
(i.e. additional interest charges, or advertising expenses) that result from a delay in the 
completion of a project when the delay is caused by an insured event.
Private Political 
Risk Insurance
Provider: Private
Instrument type: Political, Policy, and Regulatory
Description: Private political risk insurance policies generally guarantee asset coverage in 
the events of confiscation and expropriation, as well as contracts coverage such as license 
cancellations, currency inconvertibility, trade embargoes, strikes, riots, and loss of income 
following expropriation. Compensation is usually based on book value, while premiums 
are relatively higher than for public insurers, but still attractive for investors falling outside 
eligibility requirements for government-sponsored insurance.
Public Political 
Risk Insurance / 
Guarantee
Provider: Public
Instrument type: Political, Policy and Regulatory
Description: Public political risk insurance providers include multilateral banks, export credit 
agencies and multilateral and bilateral organizations and corporations that promote private 
investmentPremiums are lower than for private insurers, but provision of insurance depends 
on the satisfaction of eligibility requirements. Risk guarantees are also designed to mitigate 
perceived risk related to the investment in a foreign country. This is done by providing support 
to project companies against a government’s failure to meet specific contractual obligations 
to a private or public project due to sovereign risks or political force majeure events which are 
usually under government control..
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INSTRUMENT 
TYPE
INSTRUMENT 
NAME DESCRIPTION
Revenue 
Support 
Policy
Feed-in-Tariffs 
(FiT) / Feed-in-
Premia (FiP)
Provider: Public
Risk type: Commercial, Market Risk
Description: FiT are policies that provide price certainty and long-term contracts to energy 
producers in order to help investment in renewable energy. Usually FiTs are accompanied by 
a "tariff digression” mechanism that decreases the tariff over time. FiP are composed of both 
a premium (like FiT) and the market value of electricity, exposed to market fluctuations. Risks 
related to market fluctuations are thus only partially addressed. 
Tradable permits
Provider: Public
Risk type: Commercial, Market Risk
Description: Market-based transferable permits give a value to environmental goods. This 
value can either be based on emissions reduction targets or renewable energy reduction 
targets. Credits can be allocated based on historical emissions (grandfathering) or actual 
emissions compared to projected business-as-usual emissions (baseline and credit). Although 
tradable permits are a valuable instrument for addressing revenue concerns from investors, 
they may generate new risks associated to price fluctuations in related markets. Central 
authorities can mitigate these risks by establishing price floors or allowing the banking of 
instruments.
Tax Credits / Tax 
Equity
Provider: Public
Risk type: Commercial, Market Risk
Description: A tax credit is a sum deducted from the total amount a taxpayer owes to 
the state. A low-carbon technology tax credit is any tax credit offered by a governmental 
authority as an incentive for the installation and operation of low-carbon technologies.In the 
US, Tax equity in particular is a mezzanine investment instrument generated by the structure 
of tax incentives for renewable energy.
Fossil fuel subsidy 
policy
Provider: Public
Risk type: Commercial, Market Risk
Description: Fossil fuel subsidies are governments’ actions that lower the cost of fossil fuel 
energy production, raise the price received by energy producers, or lower the price paid by 
energy consumers. They include energy prices control measures, direct government outlays or 
purchase requirements, tax breaks, and loans and insurance at favorable rates. Any action that 
removes fossil fuel subsidies very often narrows the viability gap for low-carbon technologies. 
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INSTRUMENT 
TYPE
INSTRUMENT 
NAME DESCRIPTION
Direct 
Investment
Concessional Loans 
Funding
Provider: Public
Risk type: Commercial, Market Risk
Description: In a concessional loan, while the principal loan amount needs to be paid back, 
the interest rate payments are still significantly reduced and can include a longer repayment 
period or even a gracing period. A concessional loan is classified as Official Development 
Assistance when it conveys a grant element above 25% and has an interest rate below the 
prevailing market rate.
Dedicated Private-
equity Funds
Provider: Public
Risk type: Commercial, Market Risk
Description: A dedicated private equity fund is a collective investment scheme used for 
making investments in specific equity securities according to the investment strategy of the 
managing private equity firm. The aim of these funds is to provide equity capital to attract, in 
particular, commercial investors that normally would avoid risky investments in developing 
countries.
Equity-investments 
of Development 
Banks
Provider: Public
Risk type: Commercial, Market Risk
Description: Development Banks can invest in project equity. This enhances the capital base 
of the project and reduces its overall perceived risks by giving investors increased comfort. 
Equity-investments typically correspond to about 5%-15% of a company’s total equity as the 
aim is not to take control of the company.
International 
Climate Funds
Provider: Public
Risk type: Commercial, Market Risk
Description: International Climate Funds are operating entities whose mission is to finance 
projects, programs, and policies, mainly in developing countries, related to global climate 
change mitigation and adaptation.
Public-Private 
Partnership 
Provider: Public/Private
Risk type: Commercial, Market Risk
Description: A Public-Private Partnership is a contractual agreement between a public 
agency and a private sector entity for the execution of a project, service, or facility for the use 
of the general public. Public-Private Partnerships provide for the sharing of resources (skills 
and assets), risks, and rewards between the public and the private sector.
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INSTRUMENT 
TYPE
INSTRUMENT 
NAME DESCRIPTION
Political / 
Institutional 
Support
Capacity Building / 
Tech Assistance
Provider: Public
Instrument type: Political, Policy, and Regulatory
Description: Capacity building grants can help reduce information barriers, provide technical 
assistance to projects, or help develop financial markets. The purpose of capacity building 
is to remove the obstacles that inhibit people, governments, international organizations, 
and non-governmental organizations from realizing their developmental goals and achieve 
measurable results.
Database / 
Information 
tracking tools
Provider: Public/Private
Instrument type: Political, Policy and Regulatory
Description: The lack of objective databases makes it difficult to comprehensively assess the 
risk of innovative investments. Data tracking and project classification tools make it possible 
to know the historical risk-return performances of similar infrastructure investments thus 
reducing uncertainties.
Quality Standard
Provider: Public
Instrument type: Technical, Physical Risk 
Description: Minimum quality requirements in infrastructure specifics at national level 
orbetween different countries help address many construction and operational risks. Quality 
standards are provided by national / international public and private organizations, and are 
usually based on best practices.
